A Narrative of Failure – 3 Para in Afghanistan

Recently, a friend lent me a book that he’d just bought – “3 Para”, by Patrick Bishop. The book covers the six-month deployment of the Third Battalion of the Parachute Regiment to Helmand Province in Afghanistan, beginning in April, 2006. I was a little reluctant to read this book, as I knew the ending of our military adventures as part of the so-called “War on Terror”: failure. The failure in Helmand Province was much less ignominious than that in Iraq, but a failure it was. Nonetheless, I resolved to give the book a chance.
The Paras set off for Afghanistan following a month’s training in Oman, expecting to see little combat, if any, while aiding in reconstruction projects. They soon changed their minds about that; things went wrong from the outset. As Bishop says:
“The size of the “force package”…had been the subject of long debate in London. Men and material were in short supply owing to commitments in Iraq.”
Besides this, there was no worse place in Afghanistan for British troops to be stationed. As Frank Ledwidge says in his book “Losing Small Wars”, the local Helmand populace had long memories of previous British incursions into their land:
“…the British were simply sticking to their role as the regular invaders of their country.”
James Fergusson, in his book “A Million Bullets” says:
“To the Afghan mind the return of the Brits looked like an Allah driven invitation to a punch up”.
If the Paras went to “Afghan” expecting a punch up, they got one. By June, conflict with the Taliban had begun. All “hearts and minds” activity ended, and the Paras, together with some Fusiliers, Irish Rangers and Gurkhas were engaged in desperate defensive actions against continuous Taliban attacks. Most of Bishop’s book is devoted to descriptions of these attacks, and little purpose is served by detailing them here. Even Bishop admits that the Taliban showed remarkable tenacity in continuing to attack, despite severe losses. Inevitably, the Paras suffered casualties as well. Fourteen were killed, two of whom, Corporals Brian Budd and Mark Wright, were awarded the Victoria Cross and George Cross respectively. Forty-six soldiers were wounded, many suffering life-changing injuries. The Taliban succeeded, by their constant, if costly, attacks in thwarting the principal stated aim of the Paras’ mission. Bishop again:
“The reconstruction mission had become a memory. 3 Para and their comrades were fighting a desperate war of attrition. Most of them were besieged in…”platoon houses”…fighting off daily attacks by the Taliban, who, despite taking murderous losses, kept on coming”.
Unsurprisingly, these constant battles were highly destructive of the towns and villages in which our troops were stationed. They also served the purpose of further alienating the local civilian population by destroying homes and livelihoods, and by being seen to support a corrupt local government, the worst aspect being an unbelievably corrupt police force. Ledwidge again:
“Most police posts had their “fun boy” – child catamite – and the British estimated that over 80% of policemen were regular smokers of hash…”
Small wonder then that, towards the end of the Paras’ tour, as Bishop comments:
“…the attitude of the local people seemed to have turned to one of indifference or hostility”.
The Paras themselves seem to have sensed the futility of their activity. Bishop quotes a Para officer as saying:
“What was it all about?...Well, I flattened the town and I killed a lot of Taliban…did that achieve a good effect? I don’t know”.
After six months and 498 engagements, the Paras and their comrades were withdrawn. Writing in 2007, Bishop ends the book by observing that the Paras were getting ready for another deployment to “Afghan”, as they did in 2008. Bishop went with them, writing yet another book about the conflict: “Ground Truth”. I shan’t be reading it. I might not know the details, but I know the ending for the British military. I know that the Taliban changed their tactics, resorting to less costly (for them) planting of multiple IEDs. I know that many of the places in Helmand that the Paras fought so hard to hold have since fallen to the Taliban. President Trump’s decision to continue to deploy US troops might stave off defeat for the Afghan government. How long for, no-one knows. I finished this book full of admiration for the Paras and the other soldiers and equally filled with anger at the people who sent them on an ultimately futile mission. Our memories of our Afghan adventure, and the names of those who fell in action, are slipping into history as something we would rather forget. I shall return the book to my friend when I see him, with thanks. He bought it – a hardback- in a charity shop for £0-99. Somehow, that seems to speak volumes - a sad commentary on our contribution to the "War on Terror".

3 Para soldiers in Helmand Province.